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# Inelastic Markets & “Ponzi Funds”

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# Why do prices move? EMH\* vs IMH\*\*

\* Efficient Market Hypothesis


\*\* Inelastic Market Hypothesis

## Why do prices move? (An age-old question)


- EMH\* says: because of unanticipated exogenous news
  - Most financial economists speak about the “fundamental” price, that is “*discovered*” by markets
- Is this picture of markets even a **valid rough approximation**?

# A slew of market “anomalies” at odds with EMH

- The excess volatility puzzle
  - Most “jumps” are not due to news (Cutler-Poterba-Summers, CFM)
- The trend following puzzle + (many many) other profitable “anomalies”:
  - Prices do not reflect all available information
- Bitcoin and other fancy tulips – but “bubbles do not exist” (Fama)
- The “Reddit stocks” episodes, etc. etc.



Source: Bloomberg and CFM



6 month trends: Some (obvious) public information is not included in the current price!

- Note 1: no long bias here, but no costs either
- Note 2: 2024, a record year, 2026 roaring up



See: *Two centuries of Trend Following (2014)*

## Why do prices move? (An age-old question)

- The Inelastic Market Hypothesis/Order-driven view of markets:
  - Flows **impact** prices...and price changes alter flows
  - Price “*formation*” rather than price “*discovery*”
- Such a change of paradigm has far-reaching consequences on economic theory and on the investment industry (cf. Keynes, Shiller, Soros, etc.)

# Flow do impact prices: a (not so trivial) truism

- Even though for each buyer there is a seller, trading impacts prices ("active" vs. "passive" flows breaks the symmetry)
- The EMH view: it is simply because informed traders predict prices!
- The quant view: it is a "**mechanical**", order flow effect even when trades are not informed (even random)
- (Impact is actually a major source of trading costs)




# Flows impact prices on the long run

# Flow driven prices: a long-term phenomenon!

- OK, say EMH diehards, but impact decays “quickly” anyway and has no long-term consequences – really?
- The “Inelastic Market Hypothesis” (Gabaix-Koijen)
- Randomly buying (/selling) 1\$ of the whole market increases (/decreases) the long-term market cap. by 5\$!
- Mechanism: funds are inelastic due to e.g. mandate constraints -- say 80% stocks and 20% cash

Gabaix-Koijen Multiplier  $M=5$



# Flow driven prices: a long-term phenomenon!


- The Gabaix-Koijen multiplier is more universal than imagined by GK – it is the long-term fate of the well-known square-root impact law (JPB, *Quantitative Finance* 2022)

Daily vol.

$$M = \frac{1}{2} \sigma_1 \frac{\mathcal{M}}{V_1} \times \sqrt{\frac{1}{T_m}}$$

Market cap./ADV


Memory time




Stocks (Ancerno data)

# Remark: the sqrt impact law


$$I(Q) = Y\sigma_T \sqrt{\frac{Q}{V_T}}$$



Futures (CFM data)



Stocks (TSE, Sato Kanazawa)



Stocks (AQR data, limit orders)

# The GK multiplier as the long term fate of sqrt impact (LLOB theory, with M. Benzaquen)

The general solution of Eq. (8) is given by:

$$\phi(x, t) = (\mathcal{G}_\nu * \phi_0)(x, t) + \int dy \int_0^\infty d\tau \mathcal{G}_\nu(x - y, t - \tau) s(y, \tau), \quad (9)$$

where  $\phi_0(x) = \phi(x, 0)$  denotes the initial condition, and

$$\mathcal{G}_\nu(x, t) = \max(t, 0) \frac{\exp\left[-\frac{x^2}{4\sigma_1^2 t} - \nu t\right]}{\sqrt{4\pi\sigma_1^2 t}}. \quad (10)$$

Following Donier *et al.* [44], we introduce a buy (sell) meta-order as an extra point-like source of buy (sell) particles with intensity rate  $m = Q/T$ , where  $Q$  is the volume of the metaorder and  $T$  the execution time, such that the source term in Eq. (8) becomes:  $s(x, t) = m\delta(x - x_t) \cdot \mathbb{1}_{[0, T]} + \lambda \text{sign}(x_t - x)$ .

Performing the integral over space in Eq. (9) and setting  $\phi_0(x) = \phi^{\text{st}}(x)$  yields:

$$\phi(x, t) = \phi^{\text{st}}(x) e^{-\nu t} + m \int_0^{t \wedge T} d\tau \mathcal{G}_\nu(x - x_\tau, t - \tau) - \lambda \int_0^t d\tau \text{erf}\left[\frac{x - x_\tau}{\sqrt{4D(t - \tau)}}\right] e^{-\nu(t - \tau)}. \quad (11)$$

The price  $x_t$  solves the integral equation:

$$\phi(x_t, t) = 0. \quad (12)$$

For  $\lambda, \nu \rightarrow 0$  and for  $t > T$ , one immediately recovers Eq. (16) of [44]:

$$x_t = x_t^0 = \frac{m}{\mathcal{L}} \int_0^T d\tau \mathcal{G}_0(x_t - x_\tau, t - \tau), \quad (13)$$

which boils down, at large  $t$ , to

$$x_t^0 \approx \frac{Q}{\mathcal{L}} \frac{1}{\sqrt{4\pi\sigma_1^2 t}} = \frac{\sigma_1}{\sqrt{4\pi t}} \frac{Q}{V_1}. \quad (14)$$

Setting  $t = T_m$  in this equation immediately leads to Eq. (2), up to a numerical prefactor.

In order to compute the long term impact exactly, the main idea of the calculation is to expand the price trajectory  $x_t$  in powers of  $\sqrt{\nu}$ , i.e.

$$x_t = x_t^0 + \sqrt{\nu} x_t^1 + O(\nu), \quad (15)$$

where  $x_t^0$  and  $x_t^1$  respectively denote the 0th order and 1st order contributions. In the limit of short execution times ( $T \ll T_m$ ) and small meta-order volumes  $Q \ll V_m$ , where  $V_m = V_1 T_m$  is the total volume traded during the memory time  $T_m$ , one can look for a solution of the form  $x_t^1 = F(\nu t)$ . In the long time limit  $t \gg T$ , using the zero-th order solution Eq. 14 and setting  $u = \nu t$ , Eq. (11) boils down to

$$0 = F(u) + \beta \int_0^u dv \frac{\sqrt{\nu} - \sqrt{u}}{\sqrt{\pi u v (u - v)}} e^\nu + \int_0^u dv \frac{F(u) - F(v)}{\sqrt{\pi(u - v)}} e^\nu, \quad (16)$$

where  $\beta$  depends on the fast/slow nature of the execution (see [46] for more details). The solution of this equation for  $u \gg 1$  can be found to be

$$F(u) = F_\infty - \frac{\beta}{\sqrt{u}} [1 - e^{-u}], \quad (17)$$

# ETF as a testbed for the theory

# ETF: A perfect testbed

- ETF: investment funds (both passive and active) that track **baskets of securities**
- ETFs have to file their holdings daily (GK study on mutual funds uses quarterly frequency)
- \$12 Trillion under management, thousands of ETFs
- Demand for ETF **propagates to underlying security prices** via arbitrage mechanism

## Our findings:

Inflows in  
ETF

Impact



ETF price  
increases

Trend chasing



Inflows in  
ETF

## In collaboration with:

Philippe Van Der Beck (Harvard Business School)

Dario Villamaina (CFM)

# Impact of rebalancing trades on ETF returns

- Demand for ETF propagates to underlying security prices

$$Flow_t^{ETF} \equiv \frac{\Delta Share_t^{ETF}}{Share_{t-1}^{ETF}}$$

Shares of ETF created at time  $t$   
(in percentages)

$$\Delta Share_t^{ETF} \frac{Ownership_{t-1}^{ETF}(s)}{Share_{t-1}^{ETF}} \equiv Flow_t^{ETF} Ownership_{t-1}^{ETF}(s)$$

**Demand** induced on stock  $s$  by ETF  
share issuance

$$Impact_t^{ETF} \equiv Flow_t^{ETF} \left\langle \frac{Ownership_{t-1}^{ETF}(s)}{Volume_t(s)} \right\rangle$$

Averaged over  
all stocks held  
by the ETF

**Illiquidity of  
underlying  
basket**

# A regression model

Demand for ETF propagates to underlying security prices and **in turn impacts ETF returns**

$$\text{Impact}_t^{ETF} \equiv \text{Flow}_t^{ETF} \times \mathcal{I}_t^{ETF} \longrightarrow \text{Illiquidity of underlying basket}$$


$$R_t^{ETF} = \beta \times \text{Impact}_t^{ETF} + \text{Controls} + \epsilon_t^{ETF} + \text{co-impact}$$

$\underbrace{\hspace{10em}}$   
Price impact

$$\begin{array}{ccc} & \swarrow & \searrow \\ & \Theta_F \times \text{Flow}_t^{ETF} & + \quad \Theta_I \times \mathcal{I}_t^{ETF} \\ & \underbrace{\hspace{5em}} & \underbrace{\hspace{5em}} \\ \text{"Information"} & & \text{Illiquidity premium} \end{array}$$

# A regression model: results and illustration

	Excess ETF Return				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
$f \times \mathcal{I}$		0.085*** (0.019)	0.084*** (0.019)	0.086*** (0.019)	0.078*** (0.017)
Co-Impact				0.052*** (0.009)	0.050*** (0.009)
Flow $f$	0.005* (0.002)	0.000 (0.002)	0.000 (0.002)	0.000 (0.002)	0.000 (0.002)
Fund Illiquidity $\mathcal{I}$		-0.000* (0.000)	-0.000** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.000** (0.000)



« Self-inflated returns »


# Performance chasing

# Performance predicts future flows...

- Trend chasing behaviour + persistent flows

$$\text{Flow}_{t+1}^{ETF} = \sum_{l=0}^{200} [\beta_{t-l}^R R_{t-l}^{ETF} + \beta_{t-l}^F \text{Flow}_{t-l}^{ETF}] + \epsilon_{t+1}^{ETF}$$

Cumulative sum of  
return coefficients



## But investors do not distinguish skill from impact!

$$f_{t+1}^i = \alpha_t + \beta_1 R_{\lambda,t}^{i,\perp} + \beta_2 R_{\lambda,t}^{i,\mathcal{I}} + \text{Controls} + \epsilon_{t+1}^i$$

- Can investors distinguish skill from impact  $\beta_1 \neq \beta_2$ ?

	(1)	(2)
$R$	0.2136*** (3.4301)	
$R^{\mathcal{I}}$		0.2375*** (3.5943)
$R^{\perp}$		0.2229*** (3.3425)
Controls	Yes	Yes
Effects	Time	Time
No. Obs.	1139565	1139565
R-squared	0.0150	0.0150

Investors chase both self-inflated and fundamental returns

1% self-inflated returns lead to 0.2% higher flows!



- “Ponzi funds”

# Impact: a universal effect

# Impact estimates are in line with previous measures

- Previous regressions are even better with a square-root impact model with standard parameters

$$\frac{r_t(s)}{\sigma_t(s)} = \sum_{t'=0}^T \Theta_{t'} \cdot \sqrt{\text{Impact}_{t-t'}(s)} + \text{controls} + \epsilon_t(s)$$



# Take-home messages

# IMH explains much more than EMH!

The theory explains (most?) markets anomalies

- On short to medium time scales, flows are an important determinant of price moves – independently of why people trade
- If money flows into some funds or into the market as a whole, prices will increase – for no other reason (orders of magnitude match for the 2009-2021 market run)
- Investors do not distinguish between skill and impact: direct evidence of self-sustained trends
- As appetite diminishes, impact relaxes and performance goes south: a scenario explaining the boom and bust of trends in alternative (illiquid) markets
- Prediction markets suffer from the same predicament
- Estimates of self-inflated CFM stat-arb returns: negligible

(b) Fund Illiquidity  $\mathcal{I}_{i,t} > 1$

